Search results for "Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory"
showing 10 items of 87 documents
Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures
2019
International audience; This paper deals with Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on specific union stable systems given by the winning coalitions derived from a voting game. This framework allows for analyzing new and real situations in which there exists a feedback between the economic influence of each coalition of agents and its political power. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi power solutions on the subclass of union stable systems arisen from the winning coalitions from a voting game when the influence is determined by a power index. In particular, we establish comparable axiomatizations, in this context, when co…
Non-convex power allocation games in MIMO cognitive radio networks
2013
Consideramos un escenario de reparto del espectro, basado en la detección, en una red de radio cognitiva MIMO donde el objetivo general es maximizar el rendimiento total de cada usuario de radio cognitiva optimizando conjuntamente la operación de detección y la asignación de potencia en todos los canales, bajo una restricción de interferencia para los usuarios primarios. Los problemas de optimización resultantes conducen a un juego no convexo, que presenta un nuevo desafío a la hora de analizar los equilibrios de este juego. Con el fin de hacer frente a la no convexidad del juego, utilizamos un nuevo concepto relajado de equilibrio, el equilibrio cuasi-Nash (QNE). Se demuestran las condicio…
Nonlocal Quantum XOR Games for Large Number of Players
2010
Nonlocal games are used to display differences between classical and quantum world In this paper, we study nonlocal games with a large number of players We give simple methods for calculating the classical and the quantum values for symmetric XOR games with one-bit input per player, a subclass of nonlocal games We illustrate those methods on the example of the N-player game (due to Ardehali [Ard92]) that provides the maximum quantum-over-classical advantage.
Games without repetitions on graphs with vertex disjoint cycles
1997
Games without repetitions on graphs with vertex disjoint cycles are considered. We show that the problem finding of the game partition in this class reduces to this problem for trees. A method of finding of the game partition for trees have been given in [2].
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
2006
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
Game-Theoretic Learning and Allocations in Robust Dynamic Coalitional Games
2019
The problem of allocation in coalitional games with noisy observations and dynamic environments is considered. The evolution of the excess is modeled by a stochastic differential inclusion involvin...
A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma
2016
We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…
Online Pricing via Stackelberg and Incentive Games in a Micro-Grid
2019
This paper deals with the analysis and design of online pricing mechanisms in micro-grids. Two cases are studied in which the market layer is modeled as an open-loop and closed-loop dynamical system respectively. In the case of open-loop market dynamics, the price is generated as equilibrium price of a Stackelberg game with an incentive strategy. In such Stackelberg game, the leader is the energy supplier, the follower is the consumer, and the leader plays an incentive strategy. In the case of closed-loop market dynamics, the price is obtained as a function of the power supplied and the demand. A stability analysis is provided for both cases, which sheds light on the transient and steady-st…
Crowd-Averse Cyber-Physical Systems: The Paradigm of Robust Mean-Field Games
2016
For a networked controlled system, we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and $H_{\infty}$ - optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. First, we establish a mean-field system for such games including the effects of adversarial disturbances. Second, we identify the optimal response of the individuals for a given population behavior. Third, we provide an analysis of equilibria and their stability.
Consensus in opinion dynamics as a repeated game
2018
Abstract We study an n -agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in multi-population opinion dynamics with macroscopic and microscopic intertwined dynamics. The averaging process describes the influence from neighbouring populations, whereas the input term indicates how the distribution of opinions in the population changes as a result of dynamical evolutions at a microscopic level (individuals’ changing opinions). The input term is obtained as the vector payoff of a two player repeated game. We study conditions under which the agents achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set. Such conditions build upon the approac…